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Abstract
The retreat of multiculturalism in the Netherlands has been accompanied 
by the unwavering demand for the ‘better’ integration of Muslim citizens. 
In former times, the success of integration was identified in the closing of 
linguistic, economical and educational gaps between society and newcomers. 
However, in recent years, the notion of integration has become synonymous 
with the process of secularization. Thus, Muslims’ affiliation to the Islamic 
faith is largely seen as a sign of impaired integration. This article examines 
the integration process of Dutch Muslims by the ‘old’ socioeconomic and 
‘new’ faith-related integration-criteria from a critical point of view. This 
study explores the differences in the socioeconomic status and religious 
beliefs of Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands and provides a 
new approach to the perceived gap between the ‘believing’ Muslims and 
‘secularized’ Dutchmen. It suggests that the Dutch’s intertwinement of the 
integration process with the process of secularization overlooks the persistent 
‘irrationality’ and even rising belief in the de-churched Dutch society. It finds 
that Dutch Muslims and non-Muslims display certain differences but also 
surprising similarities in their engagement with faith.  
Key-words: Integration; The Netherlands; Dutch Muslims; Secularization; 
Belief.
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Resumen
La desaparición del multiculturalismo en Holanda ha estado acompañada 
de una inquebrantable demanda por una “mejor” integración de los ciudadanos 
musulmanes. En los primeros años, el éxito de la integración fue identificado 
con la escasa brecha lingüística, económica y social entre la sociedad y los 
recién llegados. Sin embargo, en fechas recientes, la noción de integración se ha 
convertido, además, en sinónimo de proceso de secularización. De este modo, la 
afiliación de los musulmanes a la fe islámica es vista como un signo de integración 
deficiente. Este artículo examina el proceso de integración de los musulmanes 
holandeses a través de la “vieja” economía social y los “nuevos” criterios de 
integración desde un punto de vista crítico. Explora además las diferencias en 
el estatus socioeconómico y en las creencias religiosas de los musulmanes y 
no musulmanes en Holanda, y proporciona un nuevo acercamiento a la brecha 
percibida entre los musulmanes creyentes y los holandeses secularizados. Se 
sugiere que el entrelazamiento del proceso de integración con el proceso de 
secularización de los holandeses pasa por alto la persistente “irracionalidad” y la 
creciente creencia en la “des-clericalizada” sociedad holandesa. Se muestra cómo 
los holandeses musulmanes y no musulmanes mantienen ciertas diferencias bien 
que en clara disminución, pero también sorprendentes y crecientes similitudes en 
cuanto a su acercamiento a la creencia y la fe. 
Palabras-clave: integración; musulmanes holandeses; Países Bajos; 
secularización; creencia.
Introduction
 When commentators attempt to explain why the Netherlands ended its 
century long affair with multiculturalism, they often turn to the dramatic events of 
9/11 or the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004. However, this is not what explains 
the dramatic abandonment of multiculturalism and the hysterical and hawkish 
debates on Islam in this small nation. 
 The Dutch argue that what is at stake is not the issue of national security- 
but the secular nature of society and state. Indeed, terrorism is disturbing, but it 
poses little challenge to this nation. However, a new generation of assertive, con-
servative and democratic Muslims has the ability to advance dramatic social and 
political changes that will transform this secularized society beyond recognition. 
 Despite the trepidation from terrorism, the Dutch fierce reaction to its 
Muslim citizens was primarily guided by the assumption that Islam presented an 
ideology that challenges the understandings of the 60s and 70s that this nation 
treasures. The Dutch consider themselves global pioneers of secularism, athe-
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ism and social liberalism, perhaps best exemplified by the advancement of equal 
rights to gender-groups and lenient approach to soft drugs. Dutch Muslims, al-
though widely aligned with classic Western ideas of democratization, advance de-
mands for cultural recognition and religious equality, which are largely perceived 
as colliding with the nation’s appraisal of the ‘emancipation’ of society from the 
authority of religion. 
 The Dutch uneasiness about Islam seems clear: ‘being’ Dutch means 
that you support the freedom of the individual to exercise the right to break away 
from tradition, religion and the community (i.e. freedom from religion). However, 
Dutch Muslims demand to support the right to adhere or ‘return’ to religion and 
community (i.e. freedom of religion). To put it simple, the Dutch understanding 
of the right to freedom is welcoming and protective of apostates of Islam, yet 
wary about allocating this protection to those who wish to practice or advance 
their faith. It is this perceived collision of religious and secular world views that 
explains the dramatic political developments in the Netherlands. 
 Indeed, the nation is traditionally aligned with the political left. Howev-
er, after that it became clear that the Muslim immigrants were not fully allied with 
the hegemonic secular and liberal dogma (or fond of its other protégés such as the 
gay community), the nation sought to revive its long forgotten nationalism. Con-
sidering that the ‘failure’ of integration was attributed to the dogma of multicul-
turalism and its promulgation of cultural relativism, a new approach was formed. 
Nowadays, newcomers and settled Muslim immigrants are urged to adopt ‘Dutch 
values’. This is largely translated into the demand that Muslims accept the supe-
riority of secular reason. As will be shown, this transition from the “old” model 
of socioeconomic integration to the “new” expectation for secularization of Mus-
lims is the primary cause to the perceived ‘failure’ of the integration process of 
Muslims in the nation. 
 The question is whether the religious versus secular dichotomy is cor-
rect? Considering that Muslims are now expected to secularize in order to be 
identified as integrated, the non-normative question is whether there are indeed 
such fundamental differences in the manner in which Dutch Muslims and non-
Muslims approach the issue of faith. 
 This qualitative study addresses these issues from a simple yet novel 
point. By comparing the socioeconomic status and the religious beliefs of Mus-
lims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands, this study examines the commonalities 
and differences between the Dutch ‘secularists’ and Muslim ‘believers’. Section 
a briefly introduces the major events that have shaped the Dutch approach to 
the integration process to help elucidate why this study is imperative. Section b 
presents the methodological scope and the methods applied in this study. Section 
c presents the results and section d analyzes and discusses the findings in relation 
to the debates on Muslims’ ‘failed’ integration.  
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a) From socioeconomic integration to anticipation for secularization   
 
 For many European nations, the adoption of the multicultural dogma 
was accompanied with the need to rewrite the historical bonds between the nation 
and the ethnic community. This was not the case in the Netherlands. With great 
distinction to its German neighbor, the modern Dutch people never perceived 
themselves as an ethnic nation. Devoid of such an organic understanding of ‘the 
people’, the Netherlands’s decision to follow multiculturalism faced none of the 
challenges that accompany this depart of the ‘notion of the state’ from a particular 
ethnic or religious community. Furthermore, unlike French republicanism, the 
Dutch people also did not perceive the state as the symbol of one distinct national 
ideological community or culture. The Dutch historical socio-political pillar mod-
el (verzuiling) and its 1917 consociational arrangement approved the independen-
cy of the four ideological realms that constituted Dutch society: Catholicism, So-
cialism, Calvinism and Liberalism. Thusly, the Dutch traditionally perceived the 
nation as a cooperative entity assembled by very different, yet equally legitimate 
ideological constituents. 2 These historical and cultural developments established 
a natural affinity of the Netherlands to the notion of multiculturalism.
 Social and cultural developments enhanced the support for multicultur-
alism. The increased secularization of Dutch society during the 60s, the rising 
identification with the liberal realm and the attrition of the religious pillars paved 
the way for the advancement of the multicultural dogma. Although the constitu-
tional reform of 1983 terminated public financial support of the churches,3 the 
ideological and institutional relics of the pillar model and the national culture of 
deliberation (Polder thinking) sustained the ideological and institutional support 
for the empowerment of different religious, cultural and ideological groups. Due 
to a lack of organic ancestry in the nation and the historical commitment to plural-
ism and cooperation with different religious and cultural communities, there was 
also little ideological foundation for the creation of extreme right parties or for the 
advancement of arguments against immigration.4 During most of the 20th cen-
tury, the nation maintained this exceptional commitment to cultural and religious 
equality and advanced an ambitious approach to pluralism.5 
2  Lijphart, Arend. The Politics of Accommodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1968). 
3  Dekker, Paul and Ester, Peter. “Depillarization, Deconfessionalization, and De-Ideologization: 
Empirical Trends in Dutch Society 1959-1992”, Review of Religious Research, Vol. 37, No.4. 1996.
4  Lucardie, Paul. “Right-Wing Extremism in the Netherlands: Why it is still a marginal 
phenomenon”.  Paper presented at the Symposium Right-Wing Extremism in Europe, organized by 
the Academy for Politics and Current Affairs of the Hanns Seidel Foundation, Munich, in cooperation 
with the European Centre for Research and Action on Racism and anti-Semitism (CERA), Paris. 
Conference held in Berlin, November 3-5, 2000. 
5  Monsma, Stephen V. and Soper, Christopher J. The Challenge of Pluralism: Church and State in 
Five Democracies. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997). 
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 This pluralistic understanding of nationhood formed the Netherlands’s 
famed approach to immigrants and asylum seekers and catalyzed the creation 
of lenient policies and legislations to accommodate migrants.6 Across the centu-
ries, the Netherlands had welcomed a variety of immigrants, including seasonal 
workers from Germany, Huguenots from France and Jews and gypsies.7 Since the 
beginning of the 19th century, the Dutch accommodated Chinese workers and 
thousands of Moluccans and Indonesians from its former colonies. 
 As in other European nations, the more modernized immigration pol-
icies of the 1960s were fashioned in accordance to the post-WW2 need for a 
blue-collar workforce.8 To attend the economical needs, the Netherlands received 
thousands of immigrants from Turkey and Morocco, who later brought over their 
kin as part of the state’s extended family reunification laws during the 1980s. 
Furthermore, in the early 1990s the nation welcomed thousands of refugees and 
asylum seekers from various war-ridden nations.9 
 In present time, the Netherlands is home to roughly one million Mus-
lim citizens, who mainly originated from Morocco and Turkey. Dutch Muslims 
constitute an approximate 6 percent of the national population, making the Neth-
erlands the country with the second largest Muslim community in Western Eu-
rope (France has the largest Muslim community).10 Similarly to other labor and 
post-colonial immigration trends in Western Europe, Dutch Muslim immigrants 
mainly settled in urban areas. Despite the lenient and accommodating approach 
of the Netherlands to its newcomers, the new Muslim Dutchmen encountered dis-
crimination and marginalization in addition to their disadvantaged socioeconomic 
conditions.11 The underprivileged position of Muslims in the field of housing, 
education, employment and political representation continues in present times. 
For example, in Amsterdam, the number of households living under 110 percent 
of the social minimum is persistently three times higher among households with 
a non-Western (and most often Muslim background), in comparison to those with 
a Dutch background.12
6   Phillips, Anne. Multiculturalism without culture. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
2007), p.4.
7  Sneiderman, Paul M. and Hagendoorn, Louk. When ways of Life Collide. (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2007). 
8  Entzinger, Han. “The Rise and fall of Multiculturalism: The Case of The Netherlands,” in: 
Joppke, Christian and Morawska, Ewa (eds.) Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in 
Liberal Nation- States. (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave, 2003), pp 59-86. 
9  “Jaarrapport Integratie 2007,” SCP. The Hague. 2007.
10  Estimations on the number of Muslim in the Netherlands have varied greatly along the years, 
often changed either way to accommodate specific interest groups. In recent years, national agencies 
and NGOs have developed more reliable methods. See: Van Herten Mariekke and Otten, Ferdy. “Naar 
een nieuwe schatting van het aantal islamieten in Nederland” in: “Bevolkingstrends, 3e kwartaal 
2007.” Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (hereafter noted as CBS). The Hague, 2007; “Muslims in the 
Netherlands 2012”, FORUM Institute for Multicultural Affairs. Utrecht. The Netherlands. August 2012.
11  “Regionale Kerncijfers Nederland.” Dossier: Alloctonen. Grote Gemeenten. Cijfers. CBS. The 
Hague, 2013.  
12  Most of the Dutch citizens from a non-western background come from Turkey and Morocco and are 
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 Until the late 90s, the integration process of newcomers was rather un-
demanding. Immigrants were mainly expected to seize the opportunity to improve 
their linguistic skills and socioeconomic status. 
 However, dramatic developments in the Netherlands advanced a new so-
cial and political discourse that reformed the approach of authorities to the process 
of integration of newcomers and their descendents. Public concerns about the over-
loaded welfare system and influx of immigration increased during the 90s. How-
ever, criticizing multiculturalism remained a stern taboo.13 Political figures such as 
Frits Bolkestein and Pim Fortuyn had tried to disparage the lenient immigration 
policies of the 90s’ purple-labour governments, with little success. Fortuyn, a char-
ismatic gay and Christian conservative (a peculiar political alignment that exem-
plifies the uniqueness of Dutch liberalism) increasingly centralized on the alleged 
‘threat’ of Islam to the Dutch way of life.14 However, it was only after the events of 
9/11 that such ideas gained legitimacy. The controversial statements about homo-
sexuals made by the radical Dutch Imam El-Moumni and the news reports on Dutch 
youngsters celebrating 9/11 created growing unease about the presence of Mus-
lims in the Netherlands, and greater support to such critics of multiculturalism.15 In 
the following years, newspaper headlines declared on the failure of integration and 
demanded the abolishment of multiculturalism.16 Public figures such as Theo van 
Gogh and Ayaan Hirsi Ali became notable and harsh critics of Islam, while repeat-
edly referring to the Prophet as a pedophile, tyrant and Hitler.17 The assassination of 
van Gogh in 2004 by a Dutch-born Muslim changed this nation beyond recognition. 
 In the public discourse, a new ‘realist’ realm emerged, mostly identified 
with atheist intellectuals such as Herman Philipse, Paul Cliteur and Afshin Ellian, 
all highly critical of religion in general, and Islam in particular.18 Herman Philipse 
generally affiliated to the Islam religion. See: “Laag en langdurig laag inkomen; huishoudenskenmerken 
en regio.” Thema: Inkomen en bestedingen. Cijfers. Huishoudens met een laag inkomen naar regio. CBS. 
The Hague, 2010; “Allochtonen in Nederland”, Bevolkingsstatistiek. CBS. The Hague. January 1, 2012. 
13  Rabinowitz, George., Macdonald, Stuart Elaine., and Listhaug, Ola. “New players in an old 
game: Party Strategy in Multiparty Systems,” Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 24, No.2, July 1991, 
pp. 147–185.
14  F. Bolkestein, the former leader of the VVD had articulated concerns on the multicultural dogma 
in the early 90s, resulting in strong condemnations. See: Mudde, Cas and Van Holsteyn, Joop. “The 
Netherlands: Explaining the Limited Success of the Extreme Right,” in: Hainsworth, Paul. (ed.) The 
Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream (London and New York: Pinter, 
2000), pp 144-171.
15  Prins, Baukje. “The Nerve to Break Taboos: New Realism in the Dutch Discourse on 
Multiculturalism”. Journal of International Migration and Integration. Vol. 3, Issue 3-4, 2002, pp. 
363-380; Meuleman, Johan. “Headscarves, Homosexuals, and Imams in the Netherlands,” ISIM 
Newsletter. Leiden. September 8, 2001, p. 33;  Hekma,  Gert. “Imams and Homosexuality: A Post-gay 
Debate in the Netherlands,” Sexualities. Vol.5. No.2. 2002, pp 237-248.
16  Fennema, Meindert. “Het Publieke Debat na 11 September”, De Gids. Vol.165. No.3, 2002, pp. 
229-244; Ephimenco, Sylvain. Open brief aan de moslims van Nederland. Na de aanslagen van 11 
september 2001. (Utrecht: Het Spectrum, 2001); Scheffer, Paul. “Het multiculturele drama,” NRC 
Handelsblad. The Netherlands. Print edition. January 29, 2000.
17  Ali, Hirshi Ayaan. “Confrontatie, geen verzoening,” De Volkskrant. The Netherlands. Online 
edition. April 8, 2006.
18  Bruinessen, Martin. “After Van Gogh: Roots of Anti-Muslim Rage”. Paper presented at the 
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stated that Islam cultivated tribal-like attributions that make it fundamentally in-
compatible with the renaissance of Western societies.19 Philipse argued that Mus-
lims were unable to develop the personal accountability due to their unwavering 
commitment to religious and irrational doctrines. Cliteur suggested that Islam, as 
other religions, engenders aggression among believers which ultimately translates 
into the eruption of violence.20 Following this rationale, it was made clear that Mus-
lims could only become ‘true’ democratic and tolerant Dutchmen if they denounced 
their affiliation to Islam.21 By contrasting Dutch society to Islam, this discourse 
affirmed the pre-eminence of the atheist perspective due to its assumed unrelenting 
and necessary pursuit after emancipation from authority and personal freedom.
 The demand to fortify the secular nature as against the threat of the ir-
rationalism of Islam also facilitated dramatic political changes. A new right-wing 
form of nationalism advanced by Geert Wilders and his Partij Voor Vrijheid (PVV) 
utilized a sophisticated rhetoric that pitted liberal rights against Muslims. In the 
last decade the support for the PVV soared, making it one of the three largest par-
ties in parliament. As noted in my previous work, in aim to address the public un-
rest about Islam and curtail the rising support for the rising popularity of the PVV, 
the conservative and centrist parties fashioned a new and principled-strategy. The 
new approach of the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD) and Chris-
ten-Democratisch Appèl (CDA) fuses Dutch nationalism and secularism, reifying 
the supremacy of secularism in the nation while refraining from explicit racist or 
anti-Muslim positions. The new approach of the centrist parties is a final bulwark 
against the blatant anti-Muslim positions of the far-right.22 After the national elec-
tions of 2010, for the first time in history, the conservative VVD became the largest 
political party in the Netherlands.  
 The social and political developments reformed the Dutch approach to na-
tionalism and the process of integration. Since 2002, the conservative Balkenende 
(CDA) and the Rutte (VVD) Cabinets require newcomers to adapt to the ‘norms’ 
of society. For example, in September 2003, the Minister for Immigration and Inte-
gration send a “New Style Integration Policy letter” to the lower house initiating a 
new policy declaring that the ‘objective of integration’ is the formation of a “shared 
Seventh Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, organized by the Mediterranean 
Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute 
at Florence & Montecatini Terme, March 22-26, 2006. 
19  Philipse, Herman. “Stop de tribalisering van Nederland,” opinion column. NRC Handelsblad. 
The Netherlands. Online edition. September 27, 2003. 
20  Cliteur, Paul. “De Band tussen godsdienst en moraal moet worden doorgeknipt,” Trouw. The 
Netherlands. Online edition. January 13, 2003. Also see: De Beus, Jos., Van der Meer, Jelle., Lensink, 
Marlies., Huinder, Chris., Krijnen, Henk., and Pans, Larissa. “Op gespannen voet. Politieke opinies 
over de multiculturele samenleving,” The Institute for Multicultural Development (FORUM). Utrecht, 
2002, pp. 47-55.
21  Bruinessen, Martin. “After Van Gogh: Roots of Anti-Muslim Rage”…op.cita.
22  See: Elfersy, Daphna. “The Populist Extreme Right Party in the Netherlands: Evaluating the 
principled-adoption strategy”. Paper presented at the ASN World Convention at Columbia University 
in New York on April 18-20, 2013.
178 Daphna Elfersy
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 16, nº 31. Primer semestre de 2014. 
Pp. 171-192.
citizenship.” This letter stated that, in addition to the development of linguistic 
skills and closing of socio-economic gaps, newcomers are expected to “comply 
with Dutch norms”.23 Nowadays, immigrants are asked to pass a language tests and 
prove their understanding of Dutch society and commitment to its long affair with 
‘the right to dissent’ from religion and conservatism. 
 In Nationalizing Islam Spektorowski and me have shown how this new 
approach advanced various “civic integration policies” aimed to facilitate the socio-
cultural integration of Muslims into to this highly secular and liberal society.24 To do 
so, such policies founded an unprecedented intervention into the religious institu-
tions and lives of Muslims, including the monitoring and regulating of Imam train-
ing, mosques and Islamic schools and organizations.25
 However, despite these new integration policies, the public and govern-
ments remain worried about the integration of Muslims. Newspaper headlines and 
ministers repeatedly refer to the ‘integration crisis’ and warn about the ‘dangerous 
repercussions’ of the failure to integrate Muslims.26 A pivotal issue is that the critic 
towards Dutch Muslims is not centralized on the adherence to violence or terror, 
which they repeatedly denounce, but on their ‘unwillingness’ to adopt the ‘Dutch 
values and norms’, which are increasingly defined as secular and atheist.  
 The question is how to define a successful integration? Unlike other Euro-
pean nations, which following the acts of terror searched after Muslim voices that 
could convey a moderate and more ‘liberal’ form of Islam, in the Netherlands even 
the most open forms of Islam are perceived as some form of threat to the nation. It 
seems that for the Dutch, the Islamic religion, in all of its forms, is necessarily an 
irrational, tribal and archaic entity that challenges the notion of the free and ‘eman-
cipated’ secular society. Indeed, under the assumption that Dutch secular reason is 
superior due to its emancipation from the ‘irrationality’ of belief, the Dutch have 
intertwinement the integration process of Muslims with the oxymoronic expecta-
tion for Muslims’ secularization. Unsurprisingly, under this approach, Dutch Mus-
lims are often mere objects of the discourse rather than active partners in it, often 
depicted as victims of their own convictions. 
 The irony is that the rising concerns about the integration process of Dutch 
Muslims are accompanied with rather optimistic developments. Researches show 
that in the last 10 years the Muslim community has made considerable progress; the 
acceptation of democracy is irrefutable, the education levels have soared, unem-
23  “The development of an integration monitor of first and second generation immigrants in the 
Netherlands,” CBS, The Hague. October 2004, p.13. 
24   Spektorowski, Alberto and Elfersy, Daphna. Nationalizing Islam. Forthcoming. 
25  Not only newcomers, but also settled immigrant citizens (oudkomers), are required to pass 
an integration test. See: Spektorowski, Alberto and Elfersy, Daphna…ibid. Also see: Joppke, 
Christian. “Transformation of Immigrant Integration. Civic Integration and Antidiscrimination in the 
Netherlands, France, and Germany,” World Politics. Vol. 59. No.2. 2007, p. 249.
26   See for example: De Witt, Robert. “Slechte integratie grootste gevaar voor Nederland.” Elsevier. 
The Netherlands. Online edition. October 8, 2008; De Beaufort, Binnert. “Hoe gaat het eigenlijk met 
de integratie in Nederland?,” Vrij Nederland. The Netherlands. Online edition. November 29, 2008. 
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ployment levels are declining and a new Muslim middle-class has emerged. Dutch 
Muslims are clearly on a peaceful and productive path. However, Muslims have not 
abandoned their faith.
 Nowadays, the Dutch authorities evaluate the integration process of Mus-
lims by examining the socioeconomic status and the affiliation to the Islamic be-
lief. To asses the integration process, the Netherlands Institute for Social Research 
(SCP) and other governmental agencies issue annual reports that evaluate the gaps 
between the socioeconomic status of Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands. 
The SCP notes that it currently also monitors the “socio-cultural” aspects of inte-
gration, which include “value orientations” and “religion, with special attention for 
Islam.”27 Interestingly, the SCP refrains from explicitly noting the acceptation of 
“liberal” values as a sign of integration, and centers on the examination of religious 
beliefs and practices. 
 The question is if the widely shared assumption that Dutch society is in-
herently ‘free’ from the ‘irrationalism of faith’ is correct. National agencies rarely 
compare the levels of faith and religious practices of Muslims to those of non-
Muslims in the Netherlands. Thus, authorities generally assume that the affiliation 
to religion and belief among non-Muslims in the Netherlands is minute. Since such 
reports generally overlook the variety of faith, belief and religious and spiritual 
practices existing in general society, assessments of the integration of Muslims into 
society are largely based on a lopsided understanding that categorizes Muslims as 
‘believers’ and society as ‘secular’. 
 This inattentive approach to the integration process is especially problem-
atic if taking into consideration the extensive and increasing engagement of Dutch 
society with various forms of spirituality. Research reveals that the departing from 
the church is not necessarily translated to an abandonment of belief, but rather, the 
absconding of religious institutions.28 In this regard, several researches have sug-
gested that faith in the Netherlands has transformed from theism to holism (also 
referred to as ietsism, ‘somethingism’), best understood as a more individual, ob-
scure and less ethical form of spirituality.29 This new form of belief is also not void 
of critic of society’s mainstream norms.30 
27   Interestingly, the SCP refrains from noting that it monitors the level of conservatism or 
liberalism among immigrants. “Minorities and Integration”. Under section: Topics. SCP. (website). 
n/d. At: www.scp.nl
28  Davie, Grace. Religion in Britain since 1945: believing without belonging. (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1994); Halman, Loek., Luijkx Ruud., and Van Zundert, Marga. Atlas of European Values. (Leiden: 
Brill, 2005).
29  Nissen, Peter J.A. “In de leer bij ervaringsdeskundigen”, in: Bluyssen, Jan (ed.) De donkere 
stilte van God. Ervarenderwijs op zoek, (Veerhuis: Alphen aan de Maas, 2009), pp. 108-117; Dekker, 
Gerard., De Hart, Joep., and Peters, Jan. God in Nederland 1966-1996. (Amsterdam: Anthos, 1997), 
p. 18; On the changing nature of the image of God in Dutch society, see: De Vos, Marjoleine. 
Godsbeelden. Vierde J.H. van Oosbreelezing. (Delft: Centraal Boekhuis, 2005). On the challenges 
secular society faces in establishing ethics in the absence of divine providence, see: Vuijsje, Herman. 
Tot hier heeft de Heer ons geholpen. (Amsterdam: Contact, 2007).
30  De Hart, Joep. “Zwevende Gelovigen.” SCP. The Hague. May 2013, p. 239. 
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 In view of such findings, this study presents a timely question and asks 
whether the dichotomist perspective of “believer versus secularist” is a true re-
flection of the differences between Dutch Muslims and non-Muslims. Thusly, it 
aims to provide a more complete and critical evaluation of the integration process, 
as defined by Dutch authorities. It assumes that even if evaluated by the “old” 
socioeconomic and “new” secular Dutch criteria, the integration Dutch Muslims 
process is successful taking into account that Muslims and non-Muslims present 
increasing similarities in their socioeconomic status and approach to faith and 
belief. 
b) Methodology 
 
 The renowned sociologist Max Weber provides the most compelling ex-
planations to questions pertaining to secular reason’s own irrationalism. Weber of-
fers a fascinating account of the secularization process of Europe by pointing to the 
role of Protestant religious ethics in the development of the instrumental-rational 
and the capitalistic system. Weber suggests that in the Protestant European secular-
ization process, and its subsequent definition of science as a mode of knowledge, 
was accompanied by its distinction from other forms of rationalities oriented in 
belief, ultimately rendering religion as ‘irrational’ and a ‘sacrifice of the intellect’.31 
Nevertheless, Weber noted that any form of reason, whether secular or religious, is 
inherently founded on its own ‘irrationality’ due to the arbitrariness of the human 
rationalization process itself.32 
 For Weber, the disenchantment of the world was especially disturbing in 
view of the intertwinement of secularity with the profit driven capitalistic system. 
Probably best articulated by the well-known notion of the “iron cage”, Weber’s 
apprehension from a profit driven secular society stemmed out of its erosion of 
the ethical and sociological factors that cultivated the very values and notions that 
Western civilization’s treasures.33
 Considering that Weber was distrustful about the ultimate ‘rationality’ of 
secular reason, his sociology of religion provides a compelling theoretical approach 
to test the dichotomy between the ‘rational’ secular and ‘irrational’ religious forms 
of reason. Since the history of the Netherlands was heavily influenced by the Prot-
estant reformation, and especially its branch of Calvinism, this theoretical approach 
presents a compelling explanation to the tensed relations between Muslims and 
31  See: Kalberg, Stephen. “Max Weber’s types of rationality: Cornerstones for the analysis of 
rationalization processes in history.” American Journal of Sociology. 1980, pp. 1175; Weber, Max. 
“The Social Psychology of World’s Religions.” (1946d), in: Essays in Sociology. Gerth H.H. and Mills 
Wright C. (trans. and eds.), (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978, originally 1958), pp. 350-353. 
32  Turner, Bryan S. “Politics and Culture in Islamic Globalism,” in: Roland Robertson and Garrett 
William. R. (eds.) Religion and Global Order, Religion and the Political Order (New York: Paragon, 
1991), p. 90.
33   Weber, Max. “The Social Psychology of World’s Religions.” (1946d)…op.cita, pp. 331.
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non-believers in the Netherlands. For Weber, Calvinism and its strong orientation to 
the notion of predestination was pivotal to the birth of secularization, making Dutch 
society more disposed to heightened tensions with religion and other ‘irrational’ and 
competing form of reason. Indeed, in present times, the Netherlands is one of the 
top ten atheist countries in the world.34 
 The Netherlands is undeniably also the most epic example of the encoun-
ter between Muslims and a liberal and secularized society. In the nation that became 
renowned for the accommodation of drug use and the sex industry, one can now just 
as easily find a mosque or buy a Qur’an. Next to the ringing of Church bells and 
smells of bakeries and hashish, one can also enjoy from the call of the muezzin and 
aroma of delicacies from the middle-east. This study asks if such distinct sights, 
sound, cultures and people are symbolic of the underlying philosophical contrasts 
between secularity and belief, as commonly suggested by the Dutch governments, 
or different ethical world views, as implied by Weber.   
 To advance a better understanding of the integration process, as defined 
by Dutch authorities, this study examines the differences between Muslims and 
non-Muslims, while utilizing new data on faith and religion among general Dutch 
society. As such, it provides a more complete and accurate review of the alleged 
gaps between the ‘religious’ Muslims and ‘secular’ Dutchmen and the integration 
process as a whole. To evaluate the differences in the socioeconomic status and lev-
el of secularity of these two groups, this study presents the latest data on the issue, 
as provided by academic scholars, the Netherlands’ national agencies for statistics 
and various NGOs. This study evaluates the integration process in two phases: 
 1) To evaluate the classic or “old” approach to integration, this study pres-
ents updated statistics regarding the socioeconomic differences among Muslims 
and non-Muslims in the Netherlands, by noting levels of unemployment, education 
and political participation. 
 2) To asses the “new” Dutch approach to integration, this study presents 
timely statistics about adherence to religion, belief and spirituality among Muslims 
and non-Muslims in the Netherlands. It assesses the difference in the affiliation of 
these two groups to religious institutions, as presented by the affiliation and atten-
dance of mosques and churches, and the adherence of these groups to the ‘irratio-
nality of faith’, as presented by belief in the deities and a higher power.  
c) Findings  
1) Socioeconomic integration
 While there are still significant differences between the socioeconomic 
status of Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands, in the last ten years Dutch 
Muslims have made a remarkable progress. Figure One presents a variety of ex-
amples to the notable changes that have taking place among this religious minority. 
34  See: “Global index of religiosity and atheism 2012.” WIN-Gallup 
International. 2012.
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Figure One: Socioeconomic status of Muslims and non-Muslims35
Table One: Percentage of populations (aged 18-20) attending higher education in 
the Netherlands in 1995 and 2007.    
16 14
4338 43
56
Muslims from Turkish
background
Muslims from
Moroccan background
Non-Muslims
1995
2007
Table Two: Percentage of populations (aged 18-20) attending higher education in 
the Netherlands in 1995 and 2007.    
13
45 4346 40 52
18
61
Muslim women Muslim men Non-Muslim
women
Non-Muslim men
1995
2007
Table Three: Unemployment levels of Muslims and non-Muslims in the 
Netherlands in 2001, 2004 and 2009.   
9 10
3
14
21
10 12
45
Muslims from Turkish
background
Muslims from Moroccan
background
Non-Muslims
2001
2004
2009
Table Four: Number of Dutch Muslims (from Turkish or Moroccan background) 
elected to city councils in the 1994, 1998 and 2006.    
32
7
74
21
157
66
Muslims from Turkish background Muslims from Moroccan background
1994
1998
2006
35  Dutch minorities from a Turkish or Moroccan background are almost exclusively affiliated to the 
Islamic religion. As such, figures pertaining to such groups are considered as reliable approximations. 
Tables constructed by the use of statistics presented in: “Jaarrapport integratie 2008”. SCP. The 
Hague, 2008; “Statline”. CBS. n/d. At: www.statline.cbs.nl; “De positie van moslims in Nederland. 
Feiten en cijfers.” Factbook editie 2010. Institute for Multicultural Affairs. FORUM. Utrecht. The 
Netherlands. 2010
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 Although that there are differences between the socioeconomic status of 
Muslims from a Moroccan and Turkish background, often explained by the famil-
iarity Turkish immigrants had with modern markets and civic life, both Muslim 
groups present a notable advancement in the field of education, employment and 
political representation.
The advancement of Dutch Muslims is arguably best exemplified by the dramatic 
rise in the percentage of Dutch Muslims that attend higher education. As pre-
sented in Table One, the percentage of Dutch Muslims that continue to higher 
education has almost tripled since 1998, coming much closer to the national aver-
age. As presented in Table Two, the rise in the educational levels was considerable 
in both Muslim men and women, but interestingly, even more prominent among 
women. 
 As noted in Table Three, Dutch Muslims still suffer from higher levels 
of unemployment in comparison to non-Muslims. The sharp rise in the unem-
ployment levels of Muslims in 2004 are best explained by the aforementioned 
dramatic political events that occurred in the nation in this year. Nevertheless, 
despite the onset of the economic crisis in 2008, Muslims’ unemployment levels 
declined significantly. However, Dutch Muslims are still three to four times more 
likely to be unemployed in comparison to non-Muslims.
 Table Four presents the significant developments that have taken place 
in the political representation of Muslims in Dutch city councils. For example, 
in 1994, there were only 34 Muslims from a Turkish background in Dutch city 
councils. By 2006, there were 157 Turkish Muslim members in such councils.
2) The secular approach to integration
 
 Although that it is widely assumed that Muslims in the Netherlands are 
surrounded by an overwhelming atheist and secular society, there are many over-
looked similarities in the manner in which these groups approach the subject of 
religion and belief. Figures Two and Three present various examples to the impor-
tant similarities in the approach of Dutch Muslims and non-Muslims to religious 
institutions, religion and belief in general. 
* The affiliation to religious institutions: 
 For the Dutch, religious institutions are undeniably a thing of the past. 
The Dutch society has incontestably departed from its church. According to lon-
gitudinal studies performed by the Dutch bureau for cultural and social planning 
(SCP), the share of people that stated that they are unaffiliated to a church rose 
from 24 percent in 1958 to 64 percent in 2004.36 The percentage of people as-
sociated to the Roman Catholic Church dropped from 42 percent in 1958 to 17 
36   Becker, Jos and De Hart, Joep. “Godsdienstige veranderingen in Nederland,” Sociaal and 
Cultureel Planbureau (SCP). The Hague. September 2006.  
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percent in 2004. In these years the percentage of people associated to the Dutch 
Reformed Church dropped from 23 to 6 percent. However, in the last decade, the 
departing from the church has halted as figures remain fairly steady. In present 
times, about one out of three Dutchmen is associated to some kind of church. 
Even in these ‘secularized’ times, about 40 percent of Dutch society attends a 
church at least once a month.37   
Figure Two: Association to religious institutions among Muslims and non-
Muslims in the Netherlands 38
Table Five. Affiliation to religious institutions. 
Membership of a houses of worship (mosque or church) 
30 30
70 70
Muslims Non-Muslims
Affiliated to church/mosque Not affiliated to mosque or church
Table Six. Association to religious institutions.
Attendance of houses of worship (mosque or church) 
50 4050
60
Muslims Non-Muslims
Attending church/mosque once a month or more
Not attending church or mosque every month
 However, in this respect, Dutch Muslims are not that differ-
ent in their relation to the mosque. In 2004 only one quarter of all 
Turks and one fifth of Moroccans in the Netherlands were affiliated 
to an organization or mosque.39 Thus, almost equally to the ‘native’ 
37  Becker, Jos and De Hart, Joep. …ibid.
38 Tables constructed by the use of statistics presented in: Becker, Jos and De Hart, Joep. 
“Godsdienstige veranderingen in Nederland,” …op.cita; Phalet, Karen and Van Praag, Carlo. 
“Moslims in Nederland.” ...op.cita; Maliepaard, Mieke and Gijsberts, Merove. “Moslims in Nederland 
2012.” …op.cita, p.16. 
39  Phalet, Karen and Van Praag, Carlo. “Moslims in Nederland.” werkdocument 106a and 106b. 
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society, only an approximate one out of three Dutch Muslims is af-
filiated to a specific religious institution (see Table Five). Further-
more, according to polls conducted by the SCP in 2012, almost half 
of the Dutch Muslims from a Moroccan, Turkish and Somali back-
ground visit the mosque once a month, also similar to the practices 
of the general society (see Table Six).40   
Figure Three: Belief in God or a higher power among Muslims and 
non-Muslims in the Netherlands 41
Table Seven. Belief in God or other higher power. 
95 86
5 14
People with a Muslim background People with a non-Muslim background
Believe or don’t rule out the posibility of a higher power
Do not believe
* The belief in God or a higher power: 
 In present times, exploring faith by the affiliation to religious institutions 
might overlook the more fundamental issue at hand. Indeed, faith is not merely 
expressed by the attendance of churches or mosques, but also the belief in a deity 
or higher power.  
 There has been a sharp decline in the belief in certain biblical notions 
in Dutch society. The percentage of people that stated that they believe that the 
Old Testament is ‘the word of God’ has declined from 77 percent in 1966 to 31 
percent. Only 24 percent believe that Adam and Eve really existed, compared to 
75 percent in 1966, and even less believes in the existence of ‘hell’.42 
 However, the percentage of ‘native’ Dutch people that stated that they 
belief in miracles rose from 31 percent in 1991 to 43 percent in 2004.  More im-
portantly, half of the Dutch believe in a ‘life after death’, and about 40 percent 
believe in a ‘heaven’. A similar number of people stated that praying is useful. 
SCP. The Hague, June 2004.
40   Maliepaard, Mieke and Gijsberts, Merove. “Moslims in Nederland 2012.” SCP. The Hague, 
2012, p.16. 
41  Tables constructed by the use of statistics presented in: “Global index of religiosity and atheism 
2012.”…op.cita; Maliepaard, Mieke… op.cita, p. 16,182.
42  “God in Nederland 1966; Progressiviteit en Conservatisme 1970.” SCP. The Hague, 1975.
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What might be surprising to some is that the belief in the afterlife and a heaven 
has actually risen among those that are not affiliated to a church.43 As revealed by 
De Hart, as much as 76 percent report to have had at least one ‘mystic experience’ 
in their lives.44 The emergence of this new non-institutional spirituality in Dutch 
society has even been titled as the ‘religion of the self’. 
 The Netherlands is indeed in the top ten atheist countries in the world. 
However, even in this high ranked position, the share of Dutchmen that define 
themselves as atheists is only 14 percent, revealing that the large majority of this 
society still believes in, or the possibility of, the existence of some form of super-
natural higher power. According to the polls performed by Win-Gallup in 2013, 
as much as 42 percent of Dutch society even defined itself as “religious”. 45  
 Among the immigrants that came to the Netherlands from a Muslim 
background, the affiliation to Islam was always strong. The identification of 
Dutch Muslims with the Islamic religion was high and stable even in its earliest 
recordings in the early 90s, at no time falling below 90 percent.46 Almost all Dutch 
Muslims, regardless of their ethnic or national background, see great significance 
in their faith and adhere to certain basic religious provisions, such as the eating of 
halal foods. About half of the Dutch Muslim women wear the hijab. The ‘second’ 
and ‘third’ generations of Muslims are more flexible about the performance of the 
daily prayers and the wearing of the hijab.47 
 Since 95 percent of the Dutch Muslims belief in god, and about 86 
percent of the ‘native’ society beliefs in some form of notion of deity, there are 
clear similarities between the manner in which these groups approach the issue 
of belief and the possible existence of a higher power (see Table Seven in Figure 
Three). 
d) “Closing the gap”: Bourgeoisized Muslims and spiritualized secularists 
 
 This brief review of the integration process of Muslims into Dutch so-
ciety revealed a compelling reality. Despite the common perception in the public 
discourse on the ‘failure’ of Muslims’ integration, the differences between Mus-
lims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands are generally minute. 
 The “old” Dutch integration model centralized on the socioeconomic 
status of immigrants as the primary indicator of the success of the integration 
process of newcomers. As presented in section c, the levels of education, employ-
ment and political representation of Dutch Muslims have risen dramatically and 
are catching up with the levels of the general society. These findings suggest that, 
43   Becker, Jos and De Hart, Joep. “Godsdienstige veranderingen in Nederland,” …op.cita.  
44   De Hart, Joep. “Zwevende Gelovigen”…op.cita, p.167, 224.
45   “Global index of religiosity and atheism 2012.” …op.cita.
46   Maliepaard, Mieke and Gijsberts, Merove. “Moslims in Nederland 2012.” …op.cita, p.16, 182. 
47   Maliepaard, Mieke… ibid, p. 14. 
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in accordance to such “old” indicators, the integration of Muslims into the Neth-
erlands has been successful. 
 The “new” approach of the Netherlands to the integration process per-
ceives the affiliation of Muslims to the Islamic religion as a sign of impaired 
integration in view of the ‘secularized’ state of general society. Thusly, the new 
approach to the integration process implies that affiliation to religion or faith is in-
compatible to the secularized society of the nation. After comparing the affiliation 
to religious institutions and beliefs of Muslims and non-Muslims, an interesting 
picture emerges. Muslims and non-Muslims have similar levels of affiliation to 
religious institutions and a degree of resemblance in the levels of the belief in the 
existence of a God or the supernatural. 
 These findings suggest that, even if measured by the new and old crite-
ria, claims on the ‘failure of the integration of Muslims’ may be refuted. The gap 
between the newcomers and general society is indeed closing and both sides are 
contributing to the thinning of differences. One the hand, Muslims became more 
bourgeois. On the other hand, the Dutch ‘secularized’ society is still and arguably 
also increasingly affiliating to other types of belief in higher powers. 
 These findings help to reveal the absurdity of the debates surrounding the 
integration of Muslims in the Netherlands. As noted, the affiliation of Muslims 
to religion is largely seen as incompatible to the scientific rationalism of general 
society. However, this study has shown that claims in support of the superiority 
of the ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’ reason often overlook the irrational inclinations 
embedded in this secularized society. As Peter Berger has noted, “The assump-
tion that we live in a secularized world is false. The world today…is as furiously 
religious as it ever was...”48
 Needless to say, there are more substantial differences between the ad-
herence to liberal values between Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands, 
not examined in this research. Research reveals that homosexuality is severely 
frowned upon by an approximate 45 percent of Dutch Muslims, compared to 
merely 8 percent in the general population, and similar differences can be found 
when examining the positions on euthanasia, abortions and premarital sex.49 
However, Dutch authorities generally center on religious practices to asses the 
integration process, rather than the underlying ethical and moral questions these 
different systems of belief present. 
 As this study has shown, an integration policy is more than the demand 
of a nation to its newcomers. More than anything, it is a reflection of how society 
48  Berger, Peter L. (ed.) The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. 
(Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), p. 2. 
49  De Graaf, Paul M., Kalmijn, Matthijs., Kraaykamp, Gerbert., and Monden, Christiaan W.S. 
“Sociaal-culturele verschillen tussen Turken, Marokkanen en autochtonen: eerste resultaten van de 
Nederlandse LevensLoop Studie (NELLS).” Bevolkingstrends, 4e kwartaal 2011. Study conducted by 
the Tilburg, Nijmegen and Amsterdam Universities and funded by the Nederlandse Organisatie voor 
Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO). CBS. The Hague, 2011, pp. 64-69.
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perceives its ‘ideal’ self. In the case of the Netherlands, the historical commitment 
to the multicultural policies of the 80s and 90s reflected the Dutch self-appraisal 
on the successful cooperation of its four ideological pillars. In present times, the 
Netherlands primarily cherishes its secularization over its former adherence to 
tolerance. The contemporary demand posed to Muslims to secularize reflects the 
supremacy of rationalism that Dutch society believes it embodies. 
 Depicting Muslims’ affiliation to the Islamic religion as irrational and 
incompatible to the ‘objectivity’ of secular reason has undeniably helped to ob-
scure the public debates on integration. Putting to rest the religious versus secular 
debates presents new questions on the persistence of the public unrest about the 
presence of Muslims in the Netherlands. If the differences between Muslims and 
non-Muslims are not explainable by pertaining to the issues of belief, what can 
serve to explain the underlying apprehension about Muslims? At this point, two 
plausible explanations come to mind. It is either that Islam is perceived as an alien 
entity that is irreconcilable to the liberal and permissive values of the Nether-
lands, or that society utilizes the affiliation to Islam as a pretext to advance racist 
ideologies that aim to exclude certain ethnic groups from society. At this point, 
there is evidence in support of both of these points. 
 In present times, it can not be overlooked that the rejection of Mus-
lims has helped to facilitate apprehension and antagonism to other foreigners as 
well. While the PVV has centralized on the ousting of Muslims, it is increasingly 
targeting other groups, including EU-immigrants.50 During 2012, the PVV ram-
paged on failure of the Rutte Cabinet to tighten the immigration criteria of the 
green-book.51 The PVV has been attacking immigrants from Poland, Romania, 
and Bulgaria due to their alleged “nuisance, pollution or overcrowding of the 
Dutch labor market, integration process or residency”, resulting in the filing of an 
official complaint on discrimination by the Polish Ambassador.52 Such develop-
ments suggest that the PVV, despite its attempt to distant itself from fascist or 
racist movements, is essentially drawing its support from citizens that aim to shun 
the integration of any foreigners or ‘non-natives’.  
 However, as noted by Meindert Fennema, a prominent scholar at the 
University of Amsterdam, the radicalization of the PVV has also contributed to its 
diminishing electoral appeal. 53 In the 2012 elections the PVV had lost over a third 
of its voters, mostly to the conservative and labor parties, the VVD and PvdA. Al-
though that the VVD is also largely supportive of the restriction of immigration, 
it condemns the PVV’s offence remarks against Muslims and other immigrants 
50   Elfersy, Daphna. “The Populist Extreme …”…op.cita.
51  “Wilders: Nederland moet Denemarken achterna.” De Telegraaf. Online edition. November 26, 
2011, in: Elfersy, Daphna. “The Populist Extreme...”...op. cita.
52  “PVV verzamelt klachten over Oost-Europese arbeiders.”Volkskrant. Online edition. February 
8, 2012. Also see: www.meldpuntmiddenenoosteuropeanen.nl (entered June 3, 2012), in: Elfersy, 
Daphna. “The Populist Extreme...”...op.cita.
53  Visser, Jeroen. “Waarom heeft Wilders voor het Eerst sinds 2006 Verloren?”Volkskrant. Online 
edition. September 14, 2012, in: Elfersy, Daphna. “The Populist Extreme...”...op.cita.
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and prefers to emphasize the need for inclusion under conditioned terms, rather 
than ask for exclusion. The Rutte Cabinet argues that the Dutch society is con-
stantly changing under the influence of different cultures, but that ultimately, “it 
has its own distinctive character that is not replaceable.”54 By putting to rest the 
secular versus religious dichotomy, and the de-legitimization of believers under 
it, it might be possible to attend the different ethics, morals and values social and 
cultural groups wish to preserve in society.  
c) Conclusions
 This study set out to evaluate the integration process of Muslims into the 
Netherlands. In former times, the success of the integration process was gener-
ally evaluated by the socioeconomic differences between newcomers and general 
society. In the post 9/11 era, new criteria were added to evaluate the integration 
process of Muslims. Considering that the newly introduced standards define secu-
larization as an indicator of a successful integration process, this study set out to 
evaluate the integration process of Muslims by comparing their socioeconomic 
status and affiliation to faith to those of general Dutch society. 
 This study revealed that by these two criteria, the differences between 
Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands are diminishing and by no means, 
absolute. The Muslim community in the Netherlands has made an astonishing 
progress by various socioeconomic measures, coming increasingly closer to those 
of general society. More importantly, the affiliation of non-Muslims in the Neth-
erlands to faith and belief is generally not that different of Muslims’ affiliation to 
the Islamic faith. Dutch society, similarly to Dutch Muslims, adheres to a variety 
of religious beliefs and practices.  
 In view of these findings, this study concludes that socioeconomic fac-
tors or differences between secularists and religious people can not serve to ex-
plain the perceived ‘failure’ of the integration process of Muslims in the Nether-
lands. This suggests that the public apprehension of Dutch society from its Mus-
lim citizens is induced by other factors such as racism and the deeper ideological 
and ontological tensions that exist between what Weber referred to as different 
religious world views.  
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